U.S. Comptroller General David Walker of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is a rare find amongst Washington insiders. Appointed to a 15-year term in 1998 by President Clinton, General Walker is free from the typical entanglements and politics which make partisan demagoguery the norm for our elected and appointed officials. Not beholden to lobbyists, opinion polls or even the current administration, the GAO's mission
is to help improve the performance and assure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. GAO has earned a reputation for professional, objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair and balanced reviews of government programs and operations.
General Walker and the GAO consistently provide sober and refreshingly honest and constructive observations. The GAO recently released it's report SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ, Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. The 120 page report addresses seven major areas: Strategy and Costs, Security Conditions, Governance Challenges, Reconstruction Challenges, U.S. Military Readiness, Securing Munitions Sites and Alleviating Armor Shortages, and Improving Acquisition Outcomes. Each major area contains various "Enclosures" which state conclusions about the current situation in Iraq. These Enclosures contain observations, prior recommendations from past reports and oversight questions. While discussing Strategy and Costs, the report observes,
"Reported Costs for Operations in Iraq Are Increasing"
The DOD's reported costs since 2003 in Iraq total $257.5 billion. Annual expenditures have increased from $38.8 billion for 2003, to $83.4 billion for 2006. The report cites numerous reasons for cost increases including higher fuel costs. Higher fuel prices are at least partly responsible for the expenditure which has grown the most,
"... operation and maintenance expenses, including items such as support for housing, food, and services; the repair of equipment; and transportation to move people, supplies, and equipment."
Increases in the costs of military pay (reservists, hazard pay, incentives, etc.) as well as increases in the costs of procuring equipment were also cited by the report. Another observation of the report states,
"Future Iraq Costs Are Likely to Be Considerable"
The report predicts that it is likely that our military and diplomatic commitments to Iraq will continue into the "foreseeable future" and cost hundreds of billions of dollars in future costs. These two facts support Enclosure II's, conclusion,
"U.S. Commitments Involve Significant Resources, but DOD Cost Reports and Budgets Limit Transparency"
GAO has been a consistent critic of administration's fiscal tactic of funding the GWOT through annual and supplemental appropriations instead of the normal budgetary process. This tactic combined with DOD's abysmal business practices and accounting systems makes it difficult to know if current costs are being accurately reflected. Since they are most likely higher, future costs will also likely be higher than anticipated. This also prevents honest debate about the true costs of the war since nothing in the regular budget must be sacrificed to fund the GWOT through appropriations.
Another major area the report addresses is security.
"MNF-I Revised Security Transition Plan Because Iraq Could Not Effectively Take Over Security Responsibilities"
Our forces (Multi National Force - Iraq) have had to change their plans to turn over security responsibilities to the Iraqi Army and security forces a number of times. The Iraqis have consistently failed to meet critical readiness levels. More troubling is the fact that even as larger numbers of Iraqis have been trained and equipped,
"Progress in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraq Has Not Led to Improved Security Conditions"
This is most starkly demonstrated by the number of monthly attacks on all targets (civilians, coalition, and Iraqi security) since the start of the conflict. Around a 1,000 attacks occurred in Oct of 2003. In Oct of 2006, there were over 5,000 attacks. While more Iraqi security forces have been successfully equipped and trained, the number of attacks has also consistently risen. These facts drive the conclusion of Enclosure III,
"Security Conditions Have Deteriorated as Iraq Has Assumed Additional Security Responsibilities"
I believe that these assessments and other others contained in the report predict disaster for the President's plan to surge troops. Costs for the war in Iraq are rising. We cannot accurately determine exactly how much we have spent, or how much we will have to pay in the future. We only know that it is likely to cost us hundreds of billions of dollars more. The reliance on the Iraqi security forces to "stand up" has been proven time and again to be an unattainable goal. As the Iraqi government and forces have stood up, the insurgency and sectarian violence have kept pace. The number of attacks and violence has steadily increased despite the training and equipping of Iraqi forces.
This security disaster in Iraq will matched by a similar political disaster for the President at home. The President's approval numbers, already comparable to President Carter during the Iran hostage crisis or President Nixon before he resigned, will only go lower if his plan to surge in Iraq does not improve the security of Bagdhad within the next six months. During this time, Congress needs to ask all of the uncomfortable questions contained in the GAO report and keep pressure on the administration. A few of the ones relevant to the issues I discussed are,
• What are the key factors causing steady growth in agencies’ reported costs to address the situation in Iraq, and what steps are being taken to control costs?
• To what extent have U.S. government agencies estimated the future costs and financial requirements of continued efforts in Iraq?
• Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate in Iraq even as the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has increased and the Iraqi forces and government have assumed increasing responsibility for security?
• If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the administration propose to stem the violence and facilitate the achievement of U.S. objectives, including an eventual drawdown of U.S. forces?